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1 Introduction
This article examines the evolution of Taiwan’s relationship with Singapore since the
1960s as a unique case study in the Asia-Paci᠉�c. The theoretical concept of recognition in
international relations (IR) and its nexus with international law are used to analyze the
conclusion of the bilateral military and trade agreements absent diplomatic relations.
The article argues that beyond security dimensions, the two states’ struggles for
recognition exhibit the formation of national identities, which invigorate the claims for
sovereign state status in global politics. First, this article explores the emerging notion of
recognition in IR and sheds light on the signi᠉�cance of Taiwan’s presidential visit to
Singapore under its one-China policy. Second, it explains Singapore’s pursuit of external
sovereignty that led to substantive defense cooperation with Taiwan, as well as the role
of Lee Kuan Yew in facilitating Beijing–Taipei negotiations. Finally, it assesses
contemporary developments such as the inking of the Taiwan–Singapore free trade
agreement and the ᠉�rst-ever summit between the presidents of China and Taiwan in
Singapore. Hence, the political and legal analysis of Singapore–Taiwan relations enriches
the study of IR and contributes to the understanding of the foreign policy of China and
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
  
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1 Introduction
The evolution of the Taiwan–Singapore relationship since the 1960s has been an
extraordinary case of international relations (IR) in the Asia-Paci᠉�c. Notwithstanding
Singapore’s one-China policy that diplomatically recognizes the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), Taiwan, and Singapore have developed substantial relations, including the
conclusion of military and trade agreements (Jayakumar, 2011; Magcamit and Tan,
2014). The long-standing bilateral cooperation was built on high-level o᠈�cial
exchanges and led to Singapore’s critical role in cross-strait negotiations. A thorough
understanding of Taiwan’s relations with Singapore is vital to the foreign policy of the
new Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government of Taiwan and post-Lee Kuan Yew
(LKY) Singapore. Similarly profound, the political and legal analyses contribute to the
understanding of the diplomacy of China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN).
Through the concept of recognition in IR, the article o頇�ers a fresh examination of
Taiwan’s defense and economic partnership with Singapore in the absence of diplomatic
recognition. In particular, the article analyzes the extent to which Taiwan and Singapore
have grounded their distinctive identities in the interstate relationship associated with
their desired status, which led to the bilateral military and trade agreements. It argues
that beyond security dimensions, the two countries’ ‘struggles for recognition’ exhibit
the formation of national identities separate from the ‘Chinese identity’, thus prompting
the claims for sovereign state status in IR (Lindemann and Ringmar, 2012; Daase et al.,
2015). To substantiate the contention, the article provides theoretical explanations and
employs the most recent materials unveiled by senior statesmen with ᠉�rst-hand
experience.
Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework for the multifaceted notion of recognition.
It explores the concept of recognition illuminated by Thomas Lindemann and Erik
Ringmar and identi᠉�es the empirical approach to study the recognition issues in IR and
international law (Lindemann, 2012). Section 3 sheds light on the transformation of
Taiwan’s Chinese identity and its claim for sovereign state status in foreign policy. The
presidential visits to Singapore serve as a key case for Taiwan’s claim to be treated as an
equal member in the international community. Section 4 discusses the formation of
Singapore’s national identity and its pursuit of external sovereignty by forging the
defense link with Taiwan. It also explains Singapore’s unique role in facilitating
Beijing–Taipei talks in Singapore. Section 5 assesses the conclusion of the free trade
agreement (FTA), along with the ᠉�rst-ever summit between presidents of China and
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Taiwan in Singapore in 2015. Finally, Section 6 concludes with political and legal
implications of the notion of recognition.
2 Theoretical concepts of recognition
This article explores the concept of recognition and investigates the evolution of the
Taiwan–Singapore relationship. Recognition is a multidimensional notion embedded in
political theory, IR, and international law. Without exhausting the meanings of the
philosophic foundation of recognition, this article aims to empirically operationalize the
core elements of the emerging IR concept of recognition and its nexus with international
law. IR recognition theorists contribute their distinct understanding of interstate
relations to G.W.F. Hegel’s theory of recognition (Wendt, 2003; Greenhill, 2008;
Lindemann, 2012; Onuf, 2013). Hegel explained the interactions between social subjects
by examining how human beings’ pursuit of recognition has motivated human actions.
His idea of mutual recognition was based on the claim that ‘[s]elf-consciousness exists
in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only
as something acknowledged’ (Hegel, 1977, p. 111). In other words, the existence of the
‘self’ is de᠉�ned by and hinges on recognition by the ‘other’.
Hegel stressed that the process of gaining recognition is by no means straightforward.
The struggle for recognition is famously depicted in his master-slave dialectic in the
Phenomenology of Spirit, which details the master’s desire for recognition of his superior
position not just by the slave but also by the peers whom the master deems equal
(Ringmar, 1995; Hayden and Schick, 2016). Only upon receiving reciprocal recognition,
self-consciousness can be established and freedom and self-certainty can be secured.
Interpretations of Hegel’s struggle for recognition by scholars, such as Axel Honneth
and Nancy Fraser, have profoundly in�uenced the political theory that energized post-
WWII social and democratic movements (Blunden, 2007; Onuf, 2013).
While the extensive literature on political theory focuses predominantly on the struggle
for recognition within states and societies, IR scholars in the past decade began to
explore the ‘new’ dimension of recognition in international politics (Geis et al., 2015;
Hayden and Schick, 2016). The ‘constructivist turn’ ᠉�rst invigorated the cross-
disciplinary transfer of the concept of recognition to IR (Erman, 2013; Fehl, 2015; Geis et
al., 2015). As Alexander Wendt contended, an understanding of interstate relations
should go beyond the realist assumption that states struggle for security in an anarchy
(Wendt, 2003). Instead, the desire for recognition is critical to shaping the state
behavior. Drawing from political theorists’ reading of Hegel’s recognition theory, an
emerging group of IR scholars, including Lindemann and Ringmar in particular, has
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sought to crystalize the concept of recognition in IR. They center the analysis of
interstate relations on countries’ identity construction and the status claim, as well as
the nexus between IR and international law in the realm of recognition (Ringmar, 1995;
Lindemann, 2012; Erman, 2013; Iser, 2015). Misrecognition that denies recognition of
states’ identity and status will give rise to clashes, whereas mutual recognition between
states is expected to lead to cooperative gains (Wolf, 2011; Gustafsson, 2015).
The conventional approach to decipher recognition is through the perspective of
identity. Associating the politics of recognition with ‘identity politics’ is rooted in
Hegel’s concept that identity construction is developed ‘dialogically through a process of
mutual recognition’ (Fraser, 2003, pp. 23–24). Recognition denotes an intersubjective
social process in which an individual pursues others’ acknowledgement of his or her
identity and such recognition is indispensable to constituting the ‘self’ (Greenhill, 2008;
Onuf, 2013). IR scholars who subscribed to constructivist ontology transplanted the
model of identity politics to analyze interstate relations and examined the role of states’
psychological needs in prompting state actions (Wendt, 2003; Geis et al., 2015).
Identity is a �uid concept subject to change because of historical and political
surroundings. A state’s self-image or self-identity is based on its constituents’ own
self-a᠈�rming values and the state’s psychological needs attribute to such common
values. Honneth explained that ‘the constitution itself is a principles-based
interpretation of’ collective national identity that obliges the government to realize the
psychological demand for recognition (Honneth, 2012, p. 31). A denial of recognition
occurs when the state’s self-image does not correspond to how it is perceived and
treated by other states. To parallel the social process, the struggle for recognition in IR
is the practice in which states attempt to garner recognition from important others in
order to have their self-constructed identities con᠉�rmed at the world stage (Murray,
2010; Hummel, 2012; Hagstrom and Gustafsson, 2015). As Lindemann pointed out, this
identity-based pursuit of recognition is essentially the ‘struggle for prestige’
(Lindemann, 2012, p. 210). The state behavior can be motivated by a nation’s attempt to
gain the acknowledgement of its unique or superior identity such as a ‘great power’
other than security or other material considerations.
Notably, recognition does not narrowly encompass identity construction based on the
constructivist interpretation. An equally crucial, yet often-ignored, element of
recognition is the status claim, which represents the normative instead of psychological
dimension of the struggle for recognition (Lindemann, 2013; Geis et al., 2015; Iser, 2015).
While both identity construction and the status claim underline the quest for self-
esteem, the latter does not stress the distinct or unique self-image but the desire to be
treated as a normal member pursuant to ‘a socially accepted and generally
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acknowledged standard of respect’ (Lindemann, 2012, p. 212). IR recognition theorists
averred that such a departure from identity politics can trace back to Fraser’s theoretical
shift from identity to status recognition, which delved into how struggles originate from
the misrecognition of social status in speci᠉�c situations (Geis et al., 2015; Hayden and
Schick, 2016). To remedy the inequalities, her justice-based ‘principle of participatory
parity’ rests on ‘the condition of being a peer, of being on a par with others, of standing
on an equal footing’ (Fraser, 2003, p. 101; Blunden, 2007, pp. 92–96; Fehl, 2015, pp.
109–110).
In interstate relations, the status claim can be interpreted as the ‘struggle for dignity’
that strives to obtain self-esteem by securing equal status in the international
community (Wolf, 2011; Lindemann, 2012; Onuf, 2013). The denial of recognition in this
sense means the su頇�ering of discriminatory treatment under normative standards of
consideration, which will a頇�ect the legitimacy of a state or government. Such standards
do not concern whether they correspond to a state’s self-identity, but are judged upon
whether the state is treated on par with its peer countries.
Distinct from the lens of identity that centers on a state’s quest for con᠉�rmation of its
superior identity from ‘others’, the crux of the status claim is a state’s desire to be
recognized as an equal member in bilateral and multilateral interactions. In political
reality, a state’s self-stigmatized and self-glori᠉�ed image may be a result of its status
in the international order or the self-identity energizes the state to pursue a certain
status that it deems equal to its peers. Thus, identity and status, which collectively form
the struggle for recognition, are interrelated and cannot be categorically separated in
state practice.
To crystalize and operationalize the concept of recognition, IR recognition theorists have
not only derived essential elements of recognition from political theory but have also
attempted to build the missing link between IR and international law in the overlapping
arena of recognition. Legal recognition means that an existing state formally expresses
‘the willingness of their state to treat with a new state or government or to accept that
consequences, either factual or legal, �ow from a new situation’ (Grant, 1999, p. xix).
Hence, legal recognition applies to state recognition and government recognition. In the
case of Taiwan, both forms of recognition are closely intertwined. Arguably, legal
recognition based on falsi᠉�able criteria is distinct from the empirically �uid concept of
recognition in IR. While legal recognition is a zero-sum exercise, recognition in IR
involves a matter of degree of intersubjective a᠈�nity. As a basic form of recognition,
legal recognition is ful᠉�lled when it is o᠈�cially conferred by other countries, but the
struggle for recognition in IR reaches beyond the point of legal recognition and is often
a continuous process (Iser, 2015; Oeter, 2015).
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Notwithstanding the disciplinary di頇�erences, international law and the core elements of
recognition are mutually reinforcing and critical to the Taiwan–Singapore relationship.
The legal discourse on recognition has centered on two rival views (Crawford, 2012). The
declaratory doctrine perceives the existence of a state as a fact and the act of recognition
merely constitutes a declaratory statement of the state’s existence without in�uencing
its statehood. A state’s political existence is therefore ‘independent of recognition by the
other states’ (Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933). Yet, the
constitutive view holds that the statehood and associated rights and obligations are
conditional on other states’ recognition as a sovereign state. This view originated from
Hegel’s concept of mutual recognition that an entity’s sovereign power is determined ‘in
the eyes of others, i.e. to be recognized by them’ (Hegel, 1991, p. 331). While the majority of
international lawyers support the declaratory view, IR scholars urge to develop the
constitutive doctrine by studying recognition and statehood from identity and status
perspectives (Bartelson, 2013; Erman, 2013; Fabry, 2013).
As Ringmar pointed out, Hegel not only perceived a state as an autonomous actor in
international law but also as a product of consent collectively conferred by its nationals
(Ringmar, 1995). The need to be recognized concerns sovereignty, which constitutes the
foundation of self-identity and represents legal personality of statehood (Crawford,
1976, 2012; Bartelson, 2013). In other words, recognition in IR and international law has
shared commitments to the principle of sovereignty. The provocative politics of identity
often gives rise to the desire for sovereignty. Once a state ful᠉�ls citizens’ request for
recognition of the self-constructed identity as a sovereign, it is deemed to have the
supreme authority over its land and is entitled to certain sovereign rights in
international law. For instance, such sovereign rights enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations include territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality
(Charter of the United Nations, 1945).
Compared with identity, the IR concept of status is even more closely intertwined with
international law. A constructive understanding of interstate relations implicates that
recognition is essential for a political entity to possess and assert an external normative
status, which often equates with legal status in international law (Erman, 2013).
Statehood is thus de᠉�ned as having a status as an autonomous state and depends on
reciprocal recognition (Fabry, 2013). Eva Erman further elaborated that the element of
status in recognition not only involves statehood per se but instead the exercise of the
capacity of statehood that empowers a self-determining political entity (Erman, 2013).
Particularly for Taiwan, the extent of dignity that the president receives in a diplomatic
visit is vital to recognition of statehood because the head of state ‘personalizes’ the state
in international law (Watts, 2010). Another key area to demonstrate that the capacity of
statehood can be e頇�ectively exercised is the conclusion of treaties. A treaty refers to ‘an
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international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law’ (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, article 2). The issue
of whether an entity ‘possesses capacity to conclude treaties’ is often contingent on its
recognized status as a state (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, article 6).
3 Taiwan’s quest for recognition
Based on the IR concept of recognition, this article contends that Taiwan and
Singapore’s struggles for recognition are rooted in the shift from the Chinese identity to
their distinct national identities, which have galvanized the pursuit of their sovereign
state status. While the main challenge for Singapore is recognition in IR, Taiwan’s
struggles lie in recognition in international law and in IR, which includes the core
elements of identity and status. De-recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) in global
politics and Taiwan’s democratization movement have crystalized the Taiwanese
identity, which has gradually departed from the Chinese identity (Li, 2013; Lin, 2016;
Zhong, 2016).
The Kuomintang (KMT)’s loss of Mainland China to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
in 1949 and the 1991 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 that transferred
the ‘China’ seat from the ROC to the PRC rendered Taiwan’s status an ‘entity sui generis’.
The ROC on Taiwan was deprived of the membership of all UN agencies and is currently
diplomatically recognized by only 21 states such as Panama and Vatican (Ministry of
Foreign A頇�airs Taiwan, 2016). From a technical aspect, recognition of the ROC involves
government recognition rather than state recognition, as ‘the state of China’ remains
unchanged regardless of the change of governments. Countries that recognize the ROC
deem it to be ‘the government of China’, instead of recognizing Taiwan as a separate
state. Yet, from the judicial perspective that determines Taiwan’s legal status for
functional purposes such as sovereign immunity, the courts often resort to the
declaratory doctrine by assessing whether Taiwan meets the statehood criteria in
international law (Hsieh, 2007). Notably, the ROC’s position has always been that it is a
sovereign state. The fact that neither the KMT nor the DPP government o᠈�cially
declared ‘Taiwan’ to be an independent state has no impact on the statehood issue, as a
declaration of independence is not a statehood requirement under the Montevideo
Convention.
The two-Chiang’s regime of the KMT (Chiang Kai-shek and his son and successor,
Chiang Chin-kuo) imposed the Chinese identity on Taiwan with the purpose of
eliminating Taiwanese’ Japanese identity as a result of half a century of Japanese
colonial rule. They insisted that both Mainland China and Taiwan are part of China and
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that the ROC on Taiwan represents the de jure government of China. The end of martial
law and the democratization process, including the presidential election by universal
su頇�rage during the presidency of Lee Teng-hui brought about the constructivist turn in
Taiwanese identity. From 1992 to 2016, Taiwanese’s Chinese identity plummeted from
25.5% to 4.1%, whereas the Taiwanese identity soared from 17.6% to 59.3% (Chen,
2016). Honneth’s claim that the constitution can be conceived as the interpretation of
national identity also explains the amendments, rati᠉�ed in the 1990s, to the ROC
Constitution that con᠉�nes constitutional rights to Taiwan. Article 11 of the amendments
speci᠉�cally recognizes the legal status of ‘the Chinese mainland area’, thus altering the
unrealistic o᠈�cial position as the de jure Chinese government.
The premise of identity politics is that the existence of the ‘self’ is conditioned on
recognition by others. Singapore thus functions as the particular ‘other’ for Taiwan’s
psychological demands for acknowledging its national identity. With more than a 40-
year close relationship in defense and economic arenas, Taiwan and Singapore have
made their interactions a unique case in IR. Tellingly, Singapore’s establishment of
diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1990 denotes recognition of the PRC as the sole
government of China. Nevertheless, under ‘its’ one-China policy, Singapore has in
practice perceived Taiwan as a de facto government separate from the PRC. Its strategic
ambiguity without de᠉�ning Taiwan’s status has enabled Singapore to maintain relations
with both Beijing and Taipei. In contrast with the legal approach of the United States,
neither Singapore’s diplomatic communiqué with the PRC nor domestic legislation
mentions Taiwan or accords it with a particular standing. For instance, the diplomatic
privileges accorded to Taiwanese diplomats or Taiwan’s representative o᠈�ce are based
on the established reciprocal practice (Ku, 1995). As an extraordinary anomaly in IR,
Taiwan and Singapore have developed substantive ties on a non-recognition basis and
the degree of such ties often exceed that of formal diplomatic relations.
The emerging Taiwanese identity has promoted Taipei to seek recognition of its
sovereign state status. Such recognition is beyond legal recognition and centers on
status recognition in IR that ensures the ‘parity of participation’ in global politics. Lee
Teng-hui’s pragmatic policy in the 1990s was the pioneering initiative to break
Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation. A presidential trip to foreign countries is a paramount
symbol of recognition of a nation’s status. As the head of state represents the country in
international law, the extent of dignity he or she receives relates to the exercise of the
capacity of statehood. It is particularly signi᠉�cant to Taiwan, as it has been a challenge
for Taiwan presidents to travel to countries without o᠈�cial diplomatic relations.
Against this background, the high-pro᠉�le visit of former president Lee Teng-hui to
Singapore based on the normal standards of a ‘state visit’ serves as the bedrock of
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bilateral substantive relations. As Singapore’s founding Prime Minister (PM), LKY’s
regular trips to Taiwan from 1973 and close contact with Chiang Ching-kuo were
initially for defense cooperation (Lee, 2000). LKY’s invitation to Lee, Chiang’s successor,
to visit Singapore substantially helped the isolated Taiwan government buttress its
normative claim to be treated as a sovereign state. The trip also a᠈�rmed Lee’s
pragmatic policy and strengthened his political legitimacy, given that he just succeeded
Chiang after his sudden death in 1988 (Hickey, 2007).
As the ᠉�rst Taiwan president to visit ASEAN countries, Lee’s four-day visit took place in
March 1989 (Chiu, 2010). For Singapore, receiving Lee reinforced the military
cooperation and minimized the impact on bilateral ties after Singapore’s recognition of
the PRC. LKY extended Lee ‘all the personal courtesies due to a visiting head of state’
without formal diplomatic protocol (Lee, 2000, pp. 628–629). Although Singapore
o᠈�cially addressed Lee as the president ‘from Taiwan’ rather than ‘of Taiwan’, Lee
regarded this arrangement as ‘not satisfactory, yet acceptable’ (Chiu, 2010, p. 38; Lee,
2000, pp. 628–629). The carefully chosen wording may re�ect Singapore’s delicate
balance between according Taiwan status recognition in IR and avoiding implied
recognition of Taiwan in international law. Moreover, LKY held a private meeting with
Lee in the Istana (Singapore’s presidential residence and o᠈�ce), and both Singapore
President Wee Kim Wee’s invitation letter and the dinner menu included Lee’s title,
‘President of the Republic of China’ (Chiu, 2010; Chin, 2016). These arrangements
escalated the status of Taiwan in the region and continued the connections with
Singapore’s next generation leaders.
More than two decades later, LKY’s death led to the second high-level visit to Singapore.
In 2015, former Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou �ew to Singapore to pay his respects to
LKY at the family’s private wake in the Istana (Hung and Lee, 2015). Diplomatic
complexities prevented Ma from attending the state funeral with representatives from
China and other states. Nevertheless, Singapore PM Lee Hsien Loong’s arrangement for
Ma’s visit as a ‘family friend’ made the trip possible and reiterated Singapore’s
pragmatic approach to Taiwan (The Economist, 2015).
4 The diplomacy of Singapore
Other than security dimensions, the IR notion of recognition o頇�ers an account of
Singapore’s foreign policy on remaining substantial relations with Taiwan without
diplomatic recognition. Singapore’s identity construction and status claim, which
collectively underline its struggle for recognition, have been due to its vulnerability as a
tiny nation. After British colonial rule, Singapore’s merger with Malaysia ended with the
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expulsion from the federation owing to LKY’s irreconcilable con�icts with Tunku Abdul
Rahman, the ᠉�rst Malaysian PM (Lee, 2016). Beginning with Singapore’s unwilling,
accidental independence in 1965, constructing non-race–based national identity became
critical to the nation-building process (Ortmann, 2009; Yong, 2016).
Kuala Lumpur’s swift recognition of Singapore and its admission to the UN minimized
the legal recognition obstacle, but recognition of Singapore’s distinct identity that is
entitled to sovereign equality remains a political challenge. Markedly, Singapore’s major
Chinese population features the distinction from other Southeast Asian nations. To be
perceived by Islamic neighbors, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, as the ‘third China’
could danger Singapore’s external security and shatter the internal solidarity of
multiracial communities (Jayakumar, 2011, pp. 266–267). Consequently, formulating a
national identity independent of the Chinese identity became a priority for the People’s
Action Party (PAP). Similar to Taiwan, Singapore has ground its identity in IR associated
with the desired status as a fully acknowledged sovereign state. This has shaped
Singapore’s diplomacy that ensures its exercise of sovereign rights in international law
without succumbing to pressure from regional powers such as China.
4.1 Military assistance from Taiwan
Following Singapore’s independence, building its own military force became a notable
symbol of national identity and sovereignty. The tensions with Malaysia and the
communist threat in Southeast Asia galvanized the PAP government to seek foreign
assistance for national defense. The trustworthiness of the former colonial power,
Britain, was in doubt because it had substantial commercial interests in Malaysia (Chin,
2016). Neither could the United States be an option, as it was deeply trapped in the
Vietnam War. Israeli military advisors o頇�ered assistance. Yet, this dependence on Israel
could worsen Singapore’s geopolitical situation amid the anti-Israel sentiments in
neighboring countries (Chin, 2016).
Singapore’s dilemma of receiving defense assistance could be perceived as a form of
misrecognition of its identity because its sovereign equality was not fully acknowledged.
In this regard, Taiwan acted as the ‘other’ that helped a᠈�rm Singapore’s identity by
providing military aid. As senior ROC military o᠈�cers had combat experiences with
Japanese and the Chinese Communist forces, they could provide pragmatic advice. More
importantly, Taipei’s isolation after UN Resolution 2758 and its anti-communist stance
made it eager to develop closer ties with Singapore.
Long-standing military cooperation has been built on mutual recognition of Taiwan and
Singapore’s identity and status. Based on the bilateral dialogues since 1967, Taiwanese
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advisors were ᠉�rst sent to Singapore to train military pilots under 1973 Operation Joint
Star (Liang Xing Ji Hua) (Qu, 2012). Taiwan’s assistance was subsequently extended to
help build the Singapore navy. Among military o᠈�cers ‘seconded’ to Singapore, Major
General Liu Chin-Chuan of Taiwan’s Air Force and Captain Chiu Yong-An of the Navy
represent the most noteworthy cases (Qu, 2012; Chin, 2016). Originally from Malaysia,
they not only took part in Singapore-based training but also became Singapore’s ᠉�rst
Chiefs of Air Force and Navy, respectively (Qu, 2012; Chin, 2016). In 1975, LKY’s meeting
with Chiang Chin-kuo led to the signing of the Training Protocol (Lee, 2000; Chiu,
2010). Commonly known for its code name ‘Operation Starlight’ or ‘Starlight Exercise’
(Xing Guang Ji Hua), the troops of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) wear Taiwanese
army uniforms and receive training in military bases in Taiwan. The number of troops
reached 15,000 in the 1980s, but was reduced to lower than 3,000 because of the
increase in Singapore’s overseas training bases (Chuang, 2007; Tan, 2011; Chan, 2016).
As an ‘open secret’, the scale of defense cooperation between Taiwan and Singapore is
rarely seen in non-diplomatic relations. Taiwan’s military assistance has helped
reinforce Singapore’s national identity, which is intertwined with sovereign rights,
including territorial integrity and political independence. Concluding politically salient
defense agreements also con᠉�rmed what Erman called the ‘exercise of the capacity of
statehood’, which is indispensable for status recognition. Notably, the o頇�ering of the
military training assistance on a ‘non-commercial rate’ brought practical bene᠉�ts to
Taiwan (Lee, 2000). Although Singapore did not concede to Taipei’s request for legal
recognition, the enhanced interactions such as high-level talks and the establishment of
a representative o᠈�ce in Singapore in 1969 raised the political status of Taiwan.
The PAP government has deemed the military link with Taiwan decisive for fortifying
Singapore’s security and sovereignty, but the link posed a challenge to normalize
relations with China. In the 1970s, Beijing initially denied the recognition of Singapore’s
independent status by denouncing it as the ‘running dog’ of American imperialism (Lee,
2000; Leifer, 2000). China’s progressive exportation of the proletarian revolution to
Southeast Asia also made Singapore’s contact with Beijing extra-cautious. While the
situation changed after Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Singapore in 1978 and China’s economic
reform, Singapore carefully sought to minimize geopolitical tensions by being the last
ASEAN country to recognize the PRC. Thus, Singapore only signed the diplomatic
communique with China in 1990 after Indonesian President Suharto’s decision to
normalize relations with Beijing.
When Singapore Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam discussed with his Chinese
counterparts, the PRC’s relatively ‘tolerant’ stance on SAF training in Taiwan paved the
way for LKY’s meeting with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1976 (Leifer, 2000; Desker
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and Osman, 2006). While Singapore chief negotiator, Tommy Koh, commenced
negotiations with China concerning diplomatic ties, Singapore dispatched Deputy PM
Ong Teng Cheong to seek Taipei’s understanding of new relations with Beijing (Lee,
2011). The joint diplomatic communiqué neither recognized nor acknowledged Taiwan as
part of China and Beijing acquiesced to Singapore’s continuation of the military and
o᠈�cial exchanges with Taipei (Koh, 1998; Lee, 2000).
Arguably, China’s exceptional concessions to Singapore in the 1990s could be attributed
to its keen desire to improve its ‘peaceful rise’ image and to substantiate relations with
ASEAN. Singapore thus created a unique precedent for the one-China policy without
having sacri᠉�ced its sovereign rights to maintain substantive ties with Taiwan. In
November 2016, Hong Kong customs seized the nine SAF armored vehicles, which were
shipped by a commercial carrier bound for Singapore after training in Taiwan (Torode
and Zaharia, 2016). It was alleged that Beijing would use the seizure to pressure
Singapore to change its stance on South China Sea disputes and cut military ties with
Taiwan, thus con᠉�ning the international space of the DPP government (Chan, 2016).
Hence, it would be signi᠉�cant to observe whether Singapore’s interpretation of its one-
China principle could cope with the increasingly assertive Xi Jinping administration.
4.2 Singapore’s role in cross-strait negotiations
Recognition theory explains the uniqueness of Taiwan-Singapore military ties in IR and
refutes the conventional understanding that the lack of diplomatic recognition
signi᠉�cantly con᠉�nes the bilateral relationship. The notion of recognition in IR also
provides a fresh examination of Singapore’s diplomacy that facilitates negotiations
between Beijing and Taipei. For Singapore, providing a neutral forum for cross-strait
meetings avoids being perceived as the ‘third China’. O頇�ering good o᠈�ces to the two
sides of the Taiwan Strait strengthens Singapore’s pursuit of prestige and helps forge
the Singaporean identity. Its claim for sovereign state status would also be forti᠉�ed, as
the value of the small nation in regional politics could be well recognized by super
powers. For the ROC government, holding politically sensitive dialogues with the PRC
through Singapore, a ‘foreign’ country, similarly buttressed the recognition of Taiwan’s
status on par with China.
By according Taiwan recognition of equal respect, LKY’s role in cross-strait negotiations
reinforced the defense and economic partnership. As the only mandarin-speaking
foreign leader with systemic contact with PRC and ROC presidents, LKY was a rare
channel betwee  the two sides. Remarkably, LKY made 33 and 25 trips to China and
Taiwan, respectively (Yamada, 2015). Di頇�erent from former Taiwan president Lee Teng-
hui’s high-pro᠉�le visit to Singapore, LKY’s schedules in Taipei were usually under the
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disguise of private visits (The Straits Times, 1986). Yet, the substance was comparable to
o᠈�cial visits. The attendance of LKY and his key cabinet members at Chiang Ching-
kuo’s funeral in 1988 also illustrates their personal relationship (The Straits Times,
1988).
LKY’s ties with Chiang and regular trips to Taiwan were known to Beijing. When LKY
met with Deng Xiaoping in 1985, Deng expressed his intention to ‘cooperate with
Chiang’ on Chinese reuni᠉�cation and sent his regards to Chiang, who was Deng’s old
‘schoolmate’ and LKY’s ‘good friend’ (Lee, 2000, pp. 679–682). Chiang did not respond
when LKY conveyed Deng’s message to him presumably because of his entrenched
distrust of the CCP, aggravated by the insecurity after US de-recognition of the ROC. The
situation fundamentally changed after Lee altered Chiang’s ‘Three No’s’ policy (no
contact, no compromise, and no negotiation with Beijing).
In 1991, Taiwan and China established respective quasi-governmental organizations, the
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan
Straits (ARATS), respectively (Hsieh, 2016). LKY’s role as an interlocutor between Lee
and PRC president Yang Shangkun facilitated the ᠉�rst SEF-ARATS meeting (Tzou, 2001).
Although Beijing insisted that Taiwan issues are ‘family’ a頇�airs in which no foreign
countries should intervene, LKY and Singapore’s unique role could minimize the
internationalization of cross-strait talks (Prime Minister’s O᠈�ce Singapore, 2014). The
1993 ‘Koo-Wang meeting’, which refers to the meeting between the SEF and ARATS
chairpersons, Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan, took place in Singapore. During the
unprecedented cross-strait meeting since 1949, two sides concluded four agreements
that underpinned the legal basis for subsequent negotiations.
Signi᠉�cantly, the limitation on Singapore’s role has been the versatile dynamic of cross-
strait relations because Singapore could only ‘be asked’ to be the facilitator by the two
sides. This factor is critical to the success of the Koo-Wang meeting and the failure of
the shipping joint venture (including shares from China, Singapore and Taiwan), which
Taipei proposed in 1995 (Tzou, 2001). While LKY regarded the cross-strait stability
essential to Singapore, he claimed that Chinese reuni᠉�cation would be inevitable, as
Washington will not defend Taiwan (Lee, 2011, 2013). His belief con�icted with Lee’s
᠉�rm stance on the Taiwanese identity, which had soared in presidential elections. LKY’s
‘Asian values’ in domestic politics and Lee’s idea of democratization further aggravated
their ideological clashes.
Perceived as a breakthrough for the Three Links of cross-strait exchanges, the proposed
China–Singapore–Taiwan shipping line was expected to operate in the Taiwan Strait.
According to LKY, Lee’s initiative was ‘a non-starter’ because his pro-independence
statements angered Chinese leaders (Lee, 2012). Nevertheless, Lee contended that the
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failure was because Singapore insisted on increasing its share in the venture from 10%
to 34%, as well as LKY’s unwelcome advice to ‘make China believe Taiwan recognizes
itself as part of China’ (Tzou, 2001, pp. 358–361). In addition to the incidence of the
shipping initiative, Lee Hsien Loong’s responses to China and pro-independent
president Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan serve as an important case. Before assuming the
Singapore PM position, Lee Hsien Loong’s plan to visit Taiwan incurred Beijing’s ᠉�erce
opposition in 2004. Beijing demanded that he cancel the trip and threatened that the
‘historical error’ would damage bilateral relations, including FTA negotiations
(Jayakumar, 2011).
One cannot ignore that the one-China policy has been a dynamic notion subject to
di頇�erent interpretations. The worsening cross-strait relations drove China’s diametrical
change in the attitude toward Singapore–Taiwan high-level meetings. In Beijing’s view,
after Chen’s reelection to Taiwan’s presidency by a small margin, Lee Hsien Loong’s
visit could a᠈�rm Chen’s legitimacy and push Taiwan’s identity politics further toward
independence. Arguably, Beijing also sought to take advantage of Singapore’s leadership
change to alter LKY’s established practice of visiting Taiwan (Jayakumar, 2011). To
safeguard its exercise of sovereign rights essential to status recognition, Singapore
rebuked China’s demand and responded that the private visit was consistent with
Singapore’s one-China policy, based on the mutual understanding with Beijing since
1990 (Tay, 2004). Cancelling the trip would jeopardize Singapore’s understanding of
prevailing cross-strait situations and devastate the country’s credibility and standing
(Tay, 2004; Jayakumar, 2011). Essentially, Singapore’s insistence was prompted by
China’s denial of recognition of Singapore’s status as an independent state that
possesses sovereign rights to visit foreign nations.
However, to ease Beijing’s nationalist disposition, Singapore strengthened its opposition
to Taiwan independence. At the UN General Assembly meeting, Singapore Foreign
Minister George Yeo stated that the Taiwan independence movement was ‘most
dangerous’, as it would incur war with ‘China and drag in other countries’ (Minister for
Foreign A頇�airs Singapore, 2004). This statement infuriated Taiwan’s DPP government.
Foreign Minster Chen Tan-sun of Taiwan blasted Yeo’s comments, claiming that even ‘a
country the size of a piece of snot’ could criticize Taiwan (BBC News, 2004). The DPP
government’s downgrade of Singapore’s political status inevitably deteriorated Taiwan’s
relations with Singapore. The degree of mutual political recognition was not ‘restored’
until Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT took o᠈�ce as president in 2008. These incidents in
Taiwan-Singapore relations con᠉�rm the contention of IR recognition theories that
m srecog ition of identity and status lead to interstate con�icts. Hence, maintaining a
balanced policy has been Singapore’s geopolitical challenge. Singapore has cautiously
maintained substantive relations with Taipei, but consistently stressed that Taiwanese
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‘will be on their own’ should they provoke the con�ict with Beijing (Latif, 2007; Prime
Minister’s O᠈�ce Singapore, 2016).
5 From the FTA to the Ma-Xi summit
Taiwan and Singapore’s struggles for recognition were driven by their quest for
recognition of their national identities and sovereign state status in IR and international
law. Mutual recognition of their self-esteem led to collective gains ranging from
security cooperation and cross-strait meetings to trade agreements. In recent years, a
salient development is the conclusion of the 2013 ‘Agreement between Singapore and
the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu on Economic
Partnership’ (ASTEP) (World Trade Organization, 2015). Di頇�erent from the previous
administration of Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou sought to expand Taiwan’s
international space in tandem with mending ties with Beijing under the so-called 1992
consensus on ‘one China, respective interpretations’ (Mainland A頇�airs Council, 2015).
Ma’s conciliatory approach substantially improved Taiwan’s relations with China and
Singapore, paving the way for concluding the ASTEP. This FTA also marked a rare
precedent for comprehensive trade agreements concluded between countries without
legal recognition.
Although the DPP defeated the KMT in Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election, the ASTEP
remains critical to current Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s ‘New Southbound Policy’,
which aims to expand ties with ASEAN countries (O᠈�ce of the President Republic of
China (Taiwan), 2016). The ASTEP is vital from the perspective of trade security because
Singapore and Taiwan are among each other’s top ten trade partners, and the agreement
can be a stepping stone for Taiwan-ASEAN economic relations (World Trade
Organization, 2015). Before the ASTEP, Taiwan and Singapore signed 17 economic
instruments, such as the double taxation agreement and the bilateral investment
agreement (BIA). Initial agreements from 1975 were concluded with the government
agency ‘of the Republic of China’ (Republic of China (Taiwan) Treaty and Agreement
Database). Markedly, Singapore’s recognition of Beijing in 1990 merely changed the
concluding agencies without altering the o᠈�cial nature of the agreements. Subsequent
agreements were signed with governing government units ‘in Taipei’ or between the
Singapore Trade O᠈�ce in Taipei and the Taipei Representative o᠈�ce in Singapore.
From a constructivist view, concluding an international instrument such as the ASTEP
in Taiw n’s ow  capacity buttresses the recognition of its national identity. It was
asserted that the signing of the ASTEP by representative o᠈�ces of both sides implicates
the agreement’s non-government-to-government nature (Magcamit and Tan, 2014).
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This contention does not stand, as it ignores the fact that the agreement was concluded
between two WTO members and was o᠈�cially noti᠉�ed to the WTO. To avoid the
statehood controversy, Taiwan joined the WTO as a ‘separate customs territory’, which
re�ects a political compromise. Taiwan’s position is also distinguishable from Hong
Kong’s WTO membership, which was based on the sponsorship of its ‘metropolitan
power’ (Hsieh, 2005, pp. 1201–1202). Thus, signing the ASTEP with Singapore in the
name of a separate customs territory re�ects Taiwan’s ‘struggle for prestige’ through
pursuing its own identity separate from China.
More fundamentally, the ASTEP reinforces Taiwan’s status recognition under Fraser’s
principle of participatory parity in external a頇�airs. As possessing capacity to conclude
treaties is regarded as a key element of features of recognized states, Taiwan has
attempted to demonstrate the exercise of sovereign rights by signing trade agreements.
Before 2013, Taiwan only signed FTAs with ᠉�ve Central American diplomatic allies (PPT
Slides: Taiwan’s Policy and Practices on Free Trade Agreement, 2015). The Ma
government’s breakthrough was to sign FTAs with New Zealand and Singapore, both
maintaining diplomatic ties with Beijing (Bower and Freeman, 2002; Magcamit and Tan,
2014; Young, 2014). In fact, Singapore’s informal FTA discussions with Taipei took place
before New Zealand’s, but the FTA failed to be realized due to former president Chen
Shui-bian’s instance of using the title ‘Taiwan’ in the pact (Kuomintang O᠈�cial
Website, 2010). Without ‘politicizing’ the FTA, Ma’s decision to negotiate under the WTO
framework began the FTA feasibility studies in 2010 and led to the ᠉�nalization of the
ASTEP.
The ASTEP con᠉�rms the hypothesis of recognition theorists that mutual recognition
brought cooperative gains. Given Singapore’s zero-tari頇� regime, the economic bene᠉�ts
for Taiwan center on service industries and the government procurement market.
Compared with the previous BIA that merely allows investment disputes to be settled
amicably through negotiations, the ASTEP’s detailed investor-state dispute resolution
provisions accord additional protection to investors (ASTEP, 2013). The FTA also
facilitates the interactions by establishing a joint committee to periodically review the
implementation of the agreement (ASTEP, 2013). Moreover, the high standard FTA could
facilitate Taiwan’s accession to regional mega-FTAs.
The constitutive understanding of interstate relations that IR scholars have endeavored
to develop for studying recognition from identity and status perspectives sheds light on
the Taiwan–Singapore relationship since the 1960s. After the ASTEP, the most
signi᠉�cant event was the ᠉�st-ever summit between presidents of China and Taiwan, Xi
Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou, in Singapore. Built upon the legacy of LKY’s contribution to
the 1993 Koo-Wong meeting, Singapore PM Lee Hsien Loong’s arrangement for
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according Taiwan rights of equality was critical to make Singapore the venue for the
summit in November 2015.
Meeting Xi had been on Ma’s strategic agenda. Ma preferred to hold the meeting in an
international occasion, such as the 2015 Asia-Paci᠉�c Economic Cooperation (APEC)
summit in Manila (Yuan Jian, 2015). Although Taiwan and China are both APEC
‘economies’, Taiwan presidents have been excluded from the APEC Leaders Meeting due
to the Beijing factor. As China was concerned about Taiwan’s proposal, Singapore
emerged as a mutually acceptable venue. Xi was scheduled to visit Singapore to
commemorate the 25th anniversary of Sino-Singapore diplomatic relations. The Ma-Xi
meeting could therefore be held immediately after Xi’s state visit.
The cross-strait summit included respective remarks, followed by a closed session and
press conferences. Both leaders addressed each other as ‘Mr. Ma’ and ‘Mr. Xi’ without
referring to presidential titles and rea᠈�rmed the 1992 consensus (Ma, 2015; Rajan,
2015). At the closed meeting, Ma further elaborated that Taiwan’s one-China policy was
based on the ROC Constitution (O᠈�ce of the President Republic of China (Taiwan),
2015). Outside the public agenda, Lee Hsien Loong met with Ma before he departed for
Taiwan. Lee posted a photo with Ma on the Facebook page, stating that he met
‘President Ma Ying-jeou over tea’ and that he hoped the summit ‘will lead to greater
stability and prosperity for the region’ (The Sunday Times, 2015, p. A9). To ensure its
neutrality, Singapore’s Foreign Ministry indicated that it was simply ‘requested by both
sides to help facilitate the meeting’ (Ministry of Foreign A頇�airs Singapore, 2015).
Importantly, more than 50 years following its independence, Singapore has built its
distinct national identity other than the ‘third China’. As a small state, Singapore’s
unique role in facilitating cross-strait talks has further strengthened recognition of its
salient status in Asian politics.
6 Conclusion
The article examined the politics of recognition in IR by analyzing the evolution of
Taiwan’s unique relationship with Singapore as a case study in the Asia-Paci᠉�c. It
examined why and how two states forged substantial relations absent of diplomatic
relations. Relying on the theoretical concept of recognition that IR scholars developed,
this article o頇�ered oft-neglected political motivations by exploring the extent to which
Taiwan and Singapore have grounded their distinctive identities in the interstate
rela ionship associated with their desired status. It contended that beyond security
dimensions, the two countries’ struggles for recognition of prestige and dignity
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demonstrated their formation of national identities and prompted the claims for
sovereign state status in global politics and international law.
The isolation of Taiwan following the loss of the UN seat and Singapore’s vulnerability
due to its size provided the backdrop of bilateral cooperation between the leaders of two
nations since the 1960s. Substantive bilateral relations have resulted in head of state
visits and Beijing–Taipei talks, which collectively reinforce the politically salient
military and trade agreements. The development of the Taiwan–Singapore relationship
is critical to the diplomacy of ASEAN and China. Moreover, it enriches the IR concept of
recognition by evidencing that in the absence of diplomatic relations, mutual
recognition of identity and status could decrease interstate con�icts and lead to
collective gains in bilateral relations.
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